Entendendo “pensamento pós-metafísico” no sentido da crítica moderna e positivista à metafísica como forma de conhecimento, o artigo apresenta a filosofia analítica da religião como uma resposta à tese de que a linguagem religiosa não tem sentido porque não se refere a nenhum dado empiricamente verificável ou falseável. Em primeiro lugar, é apresentada a resposta não-realista ao desafio pós-metafísico, especialmente a de D. Z. Phillips, baseada nas ideias de Wittgenstein. Nessa proposta, o sentido da linguagem religiosa não está na referência (...) a uma realidade transcendente, mas ao uso que ela tem como guia existencial e ético. Em seguida, é exposta a resposta realista à crítica antimetafísica, usando-se elementos das ideias de alguns dos principais autores da filosofia analítica da religião: Alvin Plantinga, William Alston e Richard Swinburne. Além de sustentarem o significado referencial real da linguagem religiosa, eles argumentam que a metafísica é não só defensável cognitivamente, mas também condição importante para o raciocínio científico.Taking ‘post-metaphysical thought’ in the sense of the modern and positivistic criticism to metaphysics as a form of knowledge, the article presents analytic philosophy of religion as a response to the thesis that religious language has no meaning since it does not refer to any empirically verifiable or falsifiable data. Firstly, it is presented the non-realist reply to the post-metaphysical challenge. The main non-realist author introduced is D. Z. Phillips, who based his ideas on Wittgenstein’s philosophy. According to this proposal, the meaning of religious language is not given by reference to a transcendent reality, but to its use as an ethical and existential guide. Next, it is expounded the realist position to the antimetaphysical criticism, using ideas by some of the leading authors in the analytic philosophy of religion: Alvin Plantinga, William Alston and Richard Swinburne. Apart from holding that religious language has a real referential meaning, they argue that metaphysics is not only cognitively defensible, but also an important condition for scientific reasoning. (shrink)

A work ethic is people's attitude to work—imprinted in a complex of moral values and norms, embodied in categories and examples of the culture, and expressed in human behavior, above all in the sphere of labor activity. In my understanding, a work ethic is a component part of the socioeconomic genotype of a society. A SEG is a kind of information mechanism of "social inheritance" that ensures the reproduction of the structure and principles of a particular social system's functioning, regulation, (...) and learning process. It comprises a system of values, a set of motivations, and a paradigm of economic management and administration, and in its manifest form it is reflected in the contours of the regulation and administration of socioeconomic processes, including legal, administrative, economic, and moral norms and incentives. A SEG itself is based on the system of social interests and on the particular society's culture. (shrink)

This excellent work defends the radical nature of Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology from those who want to turn it into a kind of realism. The influence of such "revisionists" "is so strong at present that the historical Husserl threatens to vanish from sight completely". Husserl, de Boer insists, eventually defined consciousness as absolute being which constitutes the world within itself. "Husserl’s entire development becomes incomprehensible when this idealism is denied". According to de Boer, Franz Brentano convinced the young Husserl that the (...) aim of philosophy was to find a way of anchoring norms in the face of relativism and historicism. Brentano sought to use scientific methodology to found a descriptive psychology which could in turn form the basis for normative sciences. Like Brentano, Husserl was taken with the idea of developing a "rigorous science" of consciousness which would help provide rational a priori values in the face of the irrational world-views so prevalent in the first part of the century. Husserl’s turn away from his early empiricism and naturalism and his eventual adoption of transcendental idealism follows from his attempt to solve three problems in Brentano’s work: 1) the relation between things in themselves and the immanent intentional object; 2) the method for founding a priori truths; 3) the naturalistic attitude inherent in Brentano’s view that positivistic-genetic psychology and phenomenological psychology have equal value in the study of consciousness. Husserl solved the second problem with the notion of the intuition of essences. He solved the first and third problems with the discovery of transcendental idealism in 1908. De Boer maintains that the denial of the thing in itself, which is still presupposed in the naturalistic standpoint operating in Logische Untersuchungen, "is the most important step of all in Husserl’s development". The notion of the thing in itself is common to the naturalistic-dogmatic belief that on the one hand there is a realm of objects independent of consciousness and that on the other hand there is consciousness which has some experience of those objects. In LU, Husserl simply suspended the question of the relation of the thing in itself to consciousness because he still regarded the latter as a kind of island within the "real" world, to which natural science alone has direct access. Despite the fact that LU rejected the naturalizing of ideas, LU continued to regard consciousness in a naturalistic way. Only the "Copernican revolution" of transcendental idealism enabled Husserl to see that the foundation of all being is absolute mind or consciousness. Because consciousness "constitutes" reality in a creative and productive sense, there is no point in speaking of a "thing in itself." Husserl’s transcendental reduction does not deny "reality," but merely rejects the naturalistic tendency to absolutize it. (shrink)

F.-W. von Herrmann was a close associate of Heidegger during the final four years of the philosopher’s life. During that time, he not only had many conversations with him, but was also granted access to many writings just now appearing in the Gesamtausgabe. As a result of his proximity to Heidegger, as well as to his writings, von Herrmann seems in a unique position to provide an authoritative account of Heidegger’s work.

This collection reconsiders the notion of life and conceptualizes those forms of life which have been excluded from modern philosophy, such as post-Anthropocene life, the life of non-human animals and the life of inorganic objects"-- Provided by publisher.

To date, our knowledge of Rift Valley fever disease spread and maintenance is still limited, as flooding, humid weather and presence of biting insects such as mosquitoes, have not completely explained RVF outbreaks. We propose a model that includes livestock, mosquitoes and ticks compartments structured according to their questing and feeding behaviour in order to study the possible role of ticks on the dynamics of RVF. To quantify disease transmission at the initial stage of the epidemic, we derive an explicit (...) formula of the basic reproductive number, $$R_0$$ R 0. Using the concept of Metzler matrix, we state necessary conditions for global asymptotic stability of the disease-free equilibrium. Results suggest that although host-ticks interactions may serve as disease reservoirs or disease amplifiers, the Aedes reproductive number should be kept under unity if disease post-epizootics activities are to be controlled. Results of both local and global sensitivity analysis of selected model parameters indicate that $$R_0$$ R 0 is more sensitive to the ticks attachment and detachment rates, probability of transmission from ticks to host and from host to ticks, length of infection in livestock and ticks death rate. Furthermore, when comparing the mean value of $$R_0$$ R 0 with that from previous studies which did not include ticks we found that our $$R_0$$ R 0 is very much larger resulting in an increase in the exponential phase of an outbreak. These findings suggest that if ticks are capable of transmitting the virus, they may be contributing to disease outbreaks and endemicity. (shrink)

This qualitative research study with a content analysis approach aimed to explore families’ experiences of an organ donation request after brain death. Data were collected through 38 unstructured and in-depth interviews with 14 consenting families and 12 who declined to donate organs. A purposeful sampling process began in October 2009 and ended in October 2010. Data analysis reached 10 categories and two major themes were listed as: 1) serenity in eternal freedom; and 2) resentful grief. The central themes were peace (...) and honor versus doubt and regret. The findings indicated that the families faced with an organ donation request of a brain-dead loved one experienced a lasting effect long after the patient's demise regardless of their decision to donate or refusal to donate. In conclusion, this study highlights the importance of family support and follow-up in an efficient healthcare system aimed at developing trust with the families and providing comfort during and after the final decision. (shrink)

In the Netherlands fertility doctors increasingly formulate protocols, which oblige patients to quit their unhealthy lifestyle before they are admitted to IVF procedures. We argue that moral arguments could justify parenting protocols that concern all future parents. In the first part we argue that want-to-be parents have moral responsibilities towards their future children to prevent them from harm by diminishing or eliminating risk factors before as well as during the pregnancy. This is because of the future children's potential to become (...) of a certain type, more specifically: a person that will be the want-to-be parents' child. Want-to-be parents intend to become pregnant and therefore have an additional moral reason to diminish the risks. Also, people who become pregnant unintentionally have the responsibility to prevent their children from harm, unless they become pregnant due to contraception failure. All people not wanting to become pregnant should use contraception methods carefully.In the second part of this paper we translate the want-to-be parents' responsibilities into practice. We distinguish four determinants of risk factors: modifiability, chance, severity and effort. We examine some evidence-based risk factors based on these variables and deduce levels of responsibility.In conclusion, formulating informal requirements for want-to-be parents is morally required and therefore also for want-to-be parents in need of medical assistance. The protocols developed by fertility doctors in the Netherlands could be seen as the precursor for a general, informal Parenting Protocol that could be developed on the basis of an extended and thoroughly debated risk-responsibility analysis. (shrink)

Emotion theorists have long held that a fundamental characteristic of an emotion is how its constituent processes change and interact over time. Assessing these temporal dynamics of emotion in the brain is critical for understanding the neural representation of emotions as well as advancing theories of emotional processing. We review the neuroimaging research on three temporal dynamic features of emotion: time of onset, duration, and resurgence and show how assessing these temporal dynamics in the brain have led to improved understanding (...) of the structure and function of emotional processes such as revealing which appraisals come first, how emotional processing endures both explicitly and implicitly, and that the resurgence of emotional processing may consist of either single or multiple processes. (shrink)

Thomas S. Kuhn's singular voice was stilled by cancer on June 17, 1996, some 49 years after his initial encounters with past science had drawn him into a career in the history and philosophy of science. One of the most widely-read and influential academics of the 20th century, Kuhn was educated at Harvard University, where he received an S.B. in Physics in 1943 and a Ph.D. in the subject in 1949. He remained there until 1956, first as a Junior Fellow (...) in the Society of Fellows from 1948 to 1951, when he in effect retrained himself as a historian of science, and then as an Assistant Professor of General Education and History of Science. He joined the faculty of the University of California, Berkeley, in 1956, becoming Professor of History of Science in 1961. From 1964 to 1979 he was on the faculty of the History of Science Program of Princeton University, and from 1972 to 1979 also a member of the Institute for Advanced Study. He moved to the Department of Linguistics and Philosophy of Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1979, where he became Professor Emeritus in 1991. He was President of the History of Science Society in 1968—70 and of the Philosophy of Science Association in 1988–90. He received the George Sarton Medal of the History of Science Society in 1982 and the John Desmond Bernal Award of the Society for the Social Studies of Science in 1983. (shrink)

Dignity is a human right and a base for human health. This right must be observed in work environments as a moral obligation. This qualitative study aimed to understand nurses’ experiences of violation of their dignity at work and to explore its dimensions. The participants were 15 nurses working in two hospitals in Tehran. The data were collected through 26 unstructured interviews and analyzed using content analysis. The dimensions of violation were ‘irreverence’, including experiences of abuse and violence, humiliation, and (...) being ignored; ‘coercion and violation of autonomy’, consisting of the control of relationships, lack of privacy, rigidness, and imposition; ‘ignoring professional and scientific ability’, indicating impossibilities in applying nurses’ knowledge; and ‘denying the value of nurse/care’, being the theme that verified the dominance of treatment/cure and lack of recognition of care value. Health systems should take the promotion of the nurses’ dignity into account through providing a dignified work environment. (shrink)

Incommensurability between successive scientific theories—the impossibility of empirical evidence dictating the choice between them—was Thomas Kuhn's most controversial proposal. Toward defending it, he directed much effort over his last 30 years into formulating precise conditions under which two theories would be undeniably incommensurable with one another. His first step, in the late 1960s, was to argue that incommensurability must result when two theories involve incompatible taxonomies. The problem he then struggled with, never obtaining a solution that he found entirely satisfactory, (...) was how to extend this initial line of thought to sciences like physics in which taxonomy is not so transparently dominant as it is, for example, in chemistry. This paper reconsiders incommensurability in the light of examples in which evidence historically did and did not carry over continuously from old laws and theories to new ones. The transition from ray to wave optics early in the nineteenth century, we argue, is especially informative in this regard. The evidence for the theory of polarization within ray optics did not carry over to wave optics, so that this transition can be regarded as a prototypical case of discontinuity of evidence, and hence of incommensurability in the way Kuhn wanted. Yet the evidence for classic geometric optics did carry over to wave optics, notwithstanding the fundamental conceptual readjustment that Fresnel's wave theory required. (shrink)

A book which might well become a classic on Heidegger. Richardson discusses most of Heidegger's works in chronological order, offering a close analysis of each. Most chapters include a general exposition of the argument of the work discussed, a detailed analysis of the problems of Thought, Being and Dasein in the work, and a résumé. While maintaining very high standards of scholarly precision in the rendering of Heidegger's ideas and terminology, Richardson yet succeeds in making his book very readable and (...) lucid. Without "supplementing" Heidegger in any way, refraining from explanatory speculations and staying always very close to the text, he manages to clarify some of the most difficult passages of Heidegger's works. His frequent cross-references make the commentary of genuine value to the advanced student as well as to the novice. Heidegger, in his own preface to the book, criticizes Richardson for the sharp distinction between Heidegger I and Heidegger II, but gives a most important substantiation to two of the author's main theories, viz., the difference between Heidegger's Seinsdenken and Husserl's phenomenology, and the central status of the concept of Ereignis in Heidegger's philosophy. Richardson regrettably does not pursue the Heidegger III suggested by Vycinas, the Heidegger of the Geviert, the question of the nature of Being as such. In some chapters at least this omission makes the interpretation seem partial and sometimes inexact. One hopes for a sequel as good and illuminating.—E. M. Z. (shrink)

A brief, non-technical, well-organized presentation of a system of aesthetics which makes use of insights typical of various Gestalt psychologists and phenomenologists but claims Wittgenstein and the school of language analysis as its only source of influence. Works of art as well as the materials the artist uses are subject to "aspection" and "animation" by various images, such that "each material is featured as a little, elementary aesthetic object." Aldrich offers a theory of evaluations and normative descriptions of works of (...) art, showing that they are not purely subjective or arbitrary. Several important issues remain quite vague throughout the book, e.g., the concept of "holophrastic perception" which is supposed to give us the nature of the "material thing" as it really is. There is a complete lack of interest in anything done in aesthetics by continental philosophers.--E. M. Z. (shrink)

Unlike most anthologies in aesthetics and the philosophy of art, the present selection does not try to collect representative extracts from the writings of most, or even many, important aestheticians throughout the ages. It aims for depth rather than width and tries to do as much justice as possible to those aestheticians which it does include, without bothering much about those left out. The result is really impressive. No less than 138 pages are devoted to Plato and Aristotle alone, where (...) the reader may find not only the usual passages from the Poetics and the Rhetoric but also relevant material from De Partibus Animalium and Politica. Such an anthology, so it seems, must be an opinionated one. Thus, while it contains some 70 pages of Dewey's Art as Experience, there is not a single line of Santayana in it. Although I disagree with the choice made in this case, I cannot but admire the courage it took to make it. Another surprise is the inclusion of the relatively obscure mediaeval thinker, Marsilio Ficino, in an anthology which excludes Baumgarten, Lessing, Burke, Schiller, Coleridge, Bosanquet and Alexander, to mention but few, and whose sole contemporary representative is Heidegger. The extracts from Ficino's commentary on Plato prove, however, to be highly interesting and relatively original, too. Thus, even if Ficino is not as great as some of the aestheticians not included in this volume, I, for one, would not regret this mark of personal, off-beat, taste. The last selection, Heidegger's "The Origin of the Work of Art," appearing for the first time in English translation, comes as special bonus to the reader. The editors' introductions to each selection are generally concise, precise, and very helpful. Sometimes, however, one may find an exception: in their introduction to the Heidegger translation, the editors characterize the Kehre as a "reversal... from the stress on anxiety, nothingness... to a stress on more affirmative moods." This is, to say the least, a grossly misleading remark, which is likely to confuse the student of the later Heidegger rather than help him.—E. M. Z. (shrink)

The book can be roughly divided in two parts. The first four chapters criticize several previous systems of aesthetics, notably those of Cassirer, Croce, and their followers, and suggest an alternative based upon an interesting extension of the recently, much-discussed theory of direct perception as a "seeing-as." Hofstadter would use this model of interpretative-perception to explicate the nature of language as well. A cry will not be, thus, an "expression" of pain but rather present the pain directly; it would articulate (...) human existence in a certain way. Accepting, in addition, the idealistic theory of Categories, Language is understood by Hofstadter as the emergence of the self and the world into a meaningful and an intelligible existence. The next three chapters which, to my mind, make the weaker part of the book, distinguish three kinds of language and, hence, three kinds of truth. There is the truth of statement, which is explicated as the identity of the meant with the existent, the truth of things, which is the practical governance of things by the self's laws and ends, and the truth of spirit, being the synthesis of the former two, where the thing reaches a full realization of its own will of being. When the life-will brings itself to full realization, the thing is perfect, i.e., it is beautiful. It is unfortunate that in the development of these important and highly interesting ideas rhetoric often takes the place of philosophical rigor. The concluding chapter, exploring "the spiritual truth of art," gives a coherent application of the theory and combines a dialogue with several aestheticians, critics, and artists with an analysis of some crucial problems in aesthetics.—E. M. Z. (shrink)

The first six chapters of this book present and criticize six views of the nature of proper names, among which are theories that proper names have no meaning or connotation, that proper names have more meaning than other signs or that their meaning is infinite, that ordinary proper names should be analysed into "logically" proper names, etc. This part of the book is the best. One may find in these chapters several well-reasoned arguments which seem to totally demolish the theories (...) under investigation. Chapters seven to nine present the author's own solution to the problem. Sørensen holds that a proper name does have a meaning—otherwise it would not have been a part of language at all. The meaning of a linguistic sign, he argues, is a set of conditions to be satisfied by an extra-linguistic entity, such that this entity may be identified as denoted by the said sign. A proper name is an individual name, and its meaning is a series of necessary and sufficient conditions for the identification of the individual entity which this name is intended to denote. It is Sørensen's view that this series consists of a definite description of final length including space and time indicators. The definiens formula for proper names is thus 'P' = 'the x that... t... p....' The discussion of this proposal is, however, greatly impaired by Sørensen's utter disregard for the rich philosophical literature existing on the subject: no attempt is made to confront his view with the now standard arguments against theories of that type. Even many inner difficulties of the proposed solution are ignored. E.g., one may ask what values do 't' and 'p' take in the definition of 'Zeus'. Or take the following puzzle: are 'The x that taught Aristotle in p at t' and 'The x that studied with Socrates in p at t' both the meaning of 'Plato'? Sørensen's view that "A national register may be looked upon as a dictionary of proper names" suggests a positive answer, but surely R and S cannot be the same meaning. Many similar problems bother the reader of Sørensen's book, but, unfortunately, they are nowhere discussed.—E. M. Z. (shrink)